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SUICIDE KILLING OF HUMAN LIFE AS A HUMAN RIGHT  
The Continuing Devolution of Assisted Suicide Law 
 in the United Kingdom 
 
Prof. William Wagner, Prof. John Kane, and Stephen P. Kallman† 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout its remarkable history, Great Britain’s culture and law 
safeguarded the dignity of human life by refusing to recognize a “right” to 
suicide. Indeed, contemporary British statutes make it a serious crime even 
to assist in the commission of a suicide killing.1 Recent parliamentary 
proposals2 and a court decision,3 however, deliberately abandoned these 
deeply-rooted cultural, historical, and legal traditions. Most recently, in an 
                                                                                                                                      
 † Before joining academia, Professor William Wagner served as a Federal Judge in the 
United States Courts, as an American Diplomat in the United States government, and as a 
Legal Counsel in the United States Senate. Professor Wagner currently holds a permanent 
appointment on the tenured faculty at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School where he teaches 
Constitutional Law and Ethics. Professor John Kane graduated magna cum laude from the 
University of Michigan Law School. He thereafter held a federal judicial clerkship with the 
Honorable Deanell Reece Tacha of the United States Court of Appeals. He subsequently 
joined the law firm of Honigman, Miller, Schwartz, and Cohn, becoming a percentage 
partner. Professor Kane currently holds a permanent appointment on the tenured faculty at 
the Thomas M. Cooley Law School where he teaches Property Law and Secured 
Transactions. Stephen P. Kallman received his J.D. degree from the Thomas M. Cooley Law 
School in May 2011. The authors express appreciation to students Joseph C. Townsend and 
Lauren Prieb for their participation in the research and writing of this piece. The worldview 
implications of this article have their genesis in the following prior works: Brief for Focus on 
the Family and the Family Research Council as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Ashcroft v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (No. 04-623), 2005 WL 737878; WILLIAM WAGNER, 
GARAVENTA CENTER FOR CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL LIFE AND AMERICAN CULTURE, Restoring 
the Intrinsic Value of Human Life, in THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 181-
93 (Margaret Monahan Hogan & Lauretta Conklin Frederking eds., 2008); William Wagner, 
John S. Kane & Geffrey Gismondi, Physician-Assisted Killing Laws, Constitutional Authority, 
and the Conscience of a Nation: Two Worldviews, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 123 (2007). 
 1. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2 (Eng.) [hereinafter Suicide Act]. 
 2. See, e.g., Coroners and Justice Bill, 2008-9, H.L. Bill [96] (Eng.) (Proposed 
Amendments 173 & 174, 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
ld200809/ldbills/033/amend/ml033-iv.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Coroners 
Amendment]. 
 3. R (Purdy) v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions (Soc’y for the Prot. of Unborn Children 
Intervening) [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] 1 A.C. 345 (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter 
Purdy]. 
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exercise of raw judicial power, five Law Lords made British history by 
declaring into existence a human right to kill human life via suicide.4 
Prosecutorial guidelines promulgated pursuant to this court decision by the 
Department of Public Prosecutor (DPP), likewise abandoned the deeply- 
rooted inalienable standard. These guidelines provide prosecutors with 
factors they may use to justify a refusal to prosecute someone who assists in 
the killing of another human being via suicide. The trend continued with 
the formation of a Commission on Death and Dying, which was charged 
with studying how the United Kingdom should employ assisted suicide 
policy.5     
In this article, we analyze the devolution of Britain’s assisted suicide 
policy. We begin by reviewing current U.K. statutory law prohibiting 
assisted suicide. We then review recent pro-suicide parliamentary proposals 
and subsequent court action recognizing suicide as a human right. We also 
analyze the DPP guidelines and other relevant contemporary government 
actions concerning assisted suicide in the United Kingdom. This critical 
review reveals a disquieting jurisprudential shift, accompanied by a 
deteriorating respect for the value of human life. Finally, we review the 
implications that accompany such a shift in worldviews and how it affects a 
nation. In the end, we conclude that viewing the value of human life 
                                                                                                                                      
 4. Id. at 366, 390. Keeping the debate in the global spotlight, two particular doctors, 
each known as Dr. Death, publicly pandered their human life termination position 
throughout the world. Australian physician Dr. Philip Nitschke founded a right to die 
organization and campaigned to legalize euthanasia. Most recently, he brought suicide 
workshops to the United Kingdom, where he panders his suicide kits. ‘Dr. Death’ Brings First 
Suicide Workshop to UK, THE TELEGRAPH (May 5, 2009, 7:11 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/5276368/Dr-Death-brings-first-
suicide-workshop-to-UK.html. The American Dr. Death, Jack Kevorkian, served eight years 
on a murder conviction. Kathleen Gray, Kevorkian Paroled: “I’m Not Going to Do It Again,” 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 14, 2006, at A1. Upon his release from prison, Kevorkian 
immediately began campaigning for laws authorising assisted suicide. Associated Press, 
Kevorkian Released After 8 Years, WASH. POST, June 2, 2007 at A2, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/01/ 
AR2007060100179.html. Prior to his recent death, Kevorkian further advocated for human 
experimentation on individuals committing suicide, as well as for the experimentation on 
handicapped infants and incompetent elderly individuals. Jack Kevorkian, The Last 
Fearsome Taboo: Medical Aspects of Planned Death, 7 MED. & L. 1, 8-9 (1988). Nitschke, 
Kevorkian, and the five Law Lords view the world through a very different lens from those 
who oppose this lethal conduct. 
 5. The Aim of the Commission, COMMISSION ON ASSISTED DYING (Aug. 17, 2010, 3:02 
AM), http://commissiononassisteddying.co.uk/the-aim-of-the-commission. 
2011] SUICIDE KILLING OF HUMAN LIFE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 29 
 
 
through the lens of human-centred, morally-relative legal positivism 
presents grave implications for the citizens of Great Britain.  
PART I.  
U.K. LAW ON ASSISTED SUICIDE 
Current statutory law prohibiting assisted killing reflects an objective 
moral standard present in Great Britain’s divine, natural, and common-law 
traditions. Pro-suicide proposals and court decisions, on the other hand, 
divorce and discard any moral reference point in the law and replace it with 
a human-centred, morally-relative approach to lawmaking.6 
When formulating law concerning suicide killing, these two 
jurisprudential worldviews collide. Like other nations, the Parliament and 
the judiciary in the United Kingdom face a choice. On the one hand, they 
may look to the objective moral standard revealed in divine or natural law 
as the benchmark and promulgate provisions reflecting that standard.  
Alternatively, they may use subjective, morally-relative legal positivism to 
create law apart from any objective moral standard of right or wrong. 
A.  The History and Tradition in Britain of Protecting the Sanctity of Human 
Life 
For most of British history, the idea that God endows all human beings 
with sacred, inalienable rights—including the right to life—was self-
evident.7 British citizens, through the law, have historically acknowledged 
and respected the God-given, and hence, inviolable dignity of every human 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. Fundamentally, two jurisprudential views of the world exist. The first view sees God 
as the source of law and rights, while the latter makes man the measure of all things. Thus, 
one can embrace either that law is something God reveals for us to discover or that it is 
something we create solely by our own reasoning—apart from any divine revelation. Dan 
Crone, Assisted Suicide and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: A Philosophical 
Examination of the Majority Opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 31 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 399, 422 (1997). See also Charles E. Rice, Rights and the Need for Objective Moral Limits, 
3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 259, 260 (2005); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the 
Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 667-69 (1997). For further jurisprudential 
worldview discussion, see WILLIAM WAGNER, The Jurisprudential Battle over the Character of 
a Nation, in JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY, (Suri Ratnapala & Gabriel Moens eds., LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2d ed. 2011). 
 7. See Crone, supra note 6, at 422 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 
(U.S. 1776)). 
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being.8 This history acknowledges that one of the fundamental roles of a 
moral government is to protect human life.9 Thus, in Britain, we 
traditionally find divine or natural-law prohibitions on suicide and later see 
such traditions embodied in British common and statutory law.10 As we 
have noted elsewhere:11 
It is no coincidence that Western cultures uniformly 
discourage—if not condemn—suicide and those who assist in 
it.12 These cultures based their ethical and legal systems on the 
Judeo-Christian tradition,13 which teaches that taking human life 
                                                                                                                                      
 8. Id. at 426. 
 9. See, e.g., Dwight G. Duncan & Peter Lubin, The Use and Abuse of History in 
Compassion in Dying, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 177 (1996). Indeed, it has been said 
that “[t]he care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only 
legitimate object of good government.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, Address to Republican Citizens of 
Washington County, Maryland, Assembled at Hagerstown on the 6th Instant, in 16 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 359 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 
1905), available at http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff16.htm. Although government must 
also protect liberty, the interest in life is plainly superior. See e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702, 741 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). Life without liberty at least holds the 
potential for renewed liberty and other goods, but liberty without life is a nullity. No one has 
the “liberty right” to unnaturally terminate one’s life because terminating one’s life is 
inherently wrong, and that which is inherently wrong cannot be a right. Although this 
proposition is self-validating, Hadley Arkes provides an illuminating discussion of the matter 
in his book on this subject. HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JUSTICE 24, 168-73 (Princeton Univ. Press 1986). 
 10. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); see supra notes 1-2; see also Nelson P. Miller, The Nobility of the American 
Lawyer: The Ennobling History, Philosophy, and Morality of a Maligned Profession, 22 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 209, 220-30 (2005) (discussing the traditions of English common law in the 
American legal system, and its strong reliance on natural and revealed law principles). 
 11. William Wagner, John S. Kane & Geffrey Gismondi, Physician-Assisted Killing Laws, 
Constitutional Authority, and the Conscience of a Nation: Two Worldviews, 24 T.M. COOLEY 
L. REV. 123, 128 (2007). 
 12. See, e.g., Willard C. Shih, Assisted Suicide, the Due Process Clause and “Fidelity in 
Translation,” 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1274 (1995). 
 13. Duncan & Lubin, supra note 9, at 185. Because of the respect for life imbued by the 
Jewish religion, suicide was rare in ancient Judaic culture. Daniel M. Crone, Historical 
Attitudes Toward Suicide, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 7, 10 (1996) (citing NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEVAS, THE 
RIGHT TO LIFE 59 (1964); and M. PABST BATTIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 31 (Prentice-Hall 
1982)). Although one historian opines that suicide was generally considered the result of 
derangement and thus not punishable in Hebraic culture, it is also reported that suicide 
victims and their families were punished by denial of the customary burial rites (though this 
would hardly seem exculpatory toward an assistor). Id. (citing NORMAN L. FARBEROW, 
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is fundamentally wrong. . . .14 Because God creates human life, 
only He can authorize the taking of it—and nowhere in His 
                                                                                                                                      
Cultural History of Suicide, in SUICIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES 4 (Normal L. Farberow ed., 
Univ. Park Press 1975); and JACQUES CHORON, SUICIDE 13-14 (Scribner 1972)).  
Hellenistic culture also may have influenced some later Jewish writers to relax their 
approbation of the act (e.g., in special circumstances, such as avoiding capture in battle), but 
Rabbinic and Talmudic writings after the Jewish exile included prohibitions on suicide and 
maintained funeral sanctions. Id. at 10-11 (citing BATTIN, supra note 13, at 32); see also 
Duncan & Lubin, supra note 9, at 187. Roman law forbade suicide and, at least under limited 
circumstances, forfeited the violator’s personal and real property to the state, so it could not 
pass to the offender’s heirs. Crone, supra note 13, at 16 (citing FARBEROW, supra note 13, at 
6); see also Duncan & Lubin, supra note 9, at 192-94, 199-200 (highlighting that Roman law 
criminalized assisting in suicide, “mercy killing” was deemed murder, and forfeiture 
occurred only in limited circumstances).  
Early Christian culture eventually came to influence Roman law with the conversion 
of the Emperor Constantine. Crone, supra note 13, at 17. Christian doctrine, as most 
famously expounded by Augustine and Aquinas, clearly forbade suicide, which, at the very 
least, implicitly prohibited assistance in suicide. Id. at 17-22; see also Duncan & Lubin, supra 
note 9, at 194-95, 197. Because of the dominant influence Christianity had on Western legal 
systems, the Judaic and Roman legal penalties for suicide persisted in Western cultures for 
many centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 741. See 
generally HAROLD J BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION (Harvard Univ. Press 1983); Crone, supra note 13, at 16. 
Luther, Calvin, and the majority of influential Reformation Christian scholars 
continued the Christian condemnation of suicide, although there were a few Christian 
writers in the seventeenth century who questioned the extent to which suicide should be 
punished as a culpable act. Crone, supra note 13, at 22-24. Despite these debates, the law in 
Western countries continued to prohibit suicide. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. In this regard, God reveals in His Word 
that the life He creates has worth, value, and significance. He declares His creation of human 
life good: “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male 
and female created he them.” Genesis 1:26, 27 (NIV); “God saw all that he had made, and it 
was very good.” Genesis 1:31 (NIV). Moreover, God intimately communicates that He has a 
plan and purpose for each life He creates: “‘For I know the plans I have for you,’ declares the 
LORD . . . .” Jeremiah 29:11 (NIV); “For we are God’s handiwork, created in Christ Jesus to do 
good works, which God prepared in advance for us to do.” Ephesians 2:10 (NIV); “For you 
created my inmost being; you knit me together in my mother’s womb. . . . Your eyes saw my 
unformed body; all the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them 
came to be.” Psalm 139:13, 16 (NIV); “For in him all things were created: things in heaven 
and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all 
things have been created through him and for him.” Colossians 1:16 (NIV); “[E]very one who 
is called by my name, whom I created for my glory, whom I formed and made.” Isaiah 43:7 
(NIV); “The God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and 
earth . . . . From one man he made all the nations, that they should inhabit the whole earth; 
and he marked out their appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands.” Acts 
17:24, 26 (NIV); “[M]y only aim is to finish the race and complete the task the Lord Jesus has 
32 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:27 
 
 
Word does He authorize suicide or assisting someone to commit 
suicide.15 God’s inviolable standard is expressed in His 
command: “Thou shalt not kill.”16 
Historically, the United Kingdom never recognized a “right” to suicide—
or assistance in committing suicide by physicians or others.17 On the 
contrary, the common law generally viewed suicide as self-murder.18 As 
with murder, assisting or attempting suicide were also criminal acts at 
common law.19 British common law continued the Judaic and Roman 
traditions of ignominious burial 20 and adopted a more expanded version of 
                                                                                                                                      
given me—the task of testifying to the good news of God’s grace.” Acts 20:24 (NIV) (relating 
the words of Paul, just prior to facing humanly unbearable adversity). 
 15. See Genesis 1:27, 5:1-2, 6:7; Job 27:8; Isaiah 42:5; John 3:36; Revelation 22:19. 
 16. Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17; see also Genesis 9:6 (NIV) (indicating that humans 
are not to be killed because “in the image of God has God made mankind”). Although the 
duty of those created to reverently respect the commands of the Creator is self-evident, it 
becomes especially compelling when one reads the commandment not to kill in pari materia 
with the First Commandment, “I am the LORD your God . . . . You shall have no other gods 
before me.” Exodus 20:2-3 (NIV); Deuteronomy 5:6-7 (NIV), and the greatest 
commandment, “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with 
all your mind.” Matthew 22:37 (NIV). 
 17. See, e.g., Suicide Act, supra note 1; Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] 1 A.C. 345.  
 18. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [5], 1 A.C. at 379 (citing R v. Dyson, [1823] Russ. & Ry. 523, 
168 Eng. Rep. 930; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711 
(“[F]or over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or 
otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”). 
 19. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [5], 1 A.C. at 379 (citing R v. Dyson, [1823] Russ. & Ry. 523, 
168 Eng. Rep. 930; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295); see also Shih, supra note 12, at 1274. 
Interestingly, if the assister provided the assistance prior to the suicide act and was not 
present at the time of the act, then the assister escaped prosecution. This is because at 
common law an accessory before the fact could not be prosecuted until the government 
prosecuted and convicted the principal felon (here the person committing felonious suicide). 
Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [6], 1 A.C at 379 (citing R v. Russel, [1832] 1 Moody 356, 168 Eng. 
Rep. 1302; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)). To rectify this problem Parliament enacted the 
Accessories and Abettors Act of 1861. Section 1 of the Act made clear that such an assister 
could be “indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if he were a principal 
felon.” Id. at [7], 1 A.C. at 379-80 (citing Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 
98, § 1 (Eng.) [hereinafter Abettors Act]; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)). Although a 
provision of the Homicide Act of 1957 later mitigated to manslaughter certain factual 
circumstances involving a suicide pact, those assisting suicide generally still faced murder 
charges. Id. at [8], 1 A.C. at 380 (citing Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 4 (Eng.) 
[hereinafter Homicide Act])). 
 20. Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 63-64 
(1985) [hereinafter Marzen I]. 
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the Roman penalty of forfeiting the personalty of one who committed 
suicide, although it discontinued the escheat of realty.21 
Whether by common law, statute, or both, the American colonies also 
generally condemned suicide and essentially continued England’s legal 
sanctions.22 
When natural-law theory dominated Western legal philosophy,23 judges, 
lawyers, and scholars recognized God’s existence and referred to His natural 
law as a source of human rights.24 These judges, lawyers, and legal scholars 
widely agreed that the common law was an expression of natural or divine 
law.25 The highest courts of Western nations cited the writings of Grotius, 
Puffendorf, and Vattel—three of Europe’s greatest natural-law scholars.26 
                                                                                                                                      
 21. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [5], 1 A.C. at 379 (citing R v. Dyson, (1823) Russ. & Ry. 523, 
168 Eng. Rep. 930; R v. Croft, [1944] K.B. 295 (Eng.)); see also Marzen I, supra note 20, at 64-
67; Thomas J. Marzen et al., “Suicide: A Constitutional Right?”—Reflections Eleven Years 
Later, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 261, 264 (1996) [hereinafter Marzen II]; Duncan & Lubin, supra note 
9, at 177. 
 22. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 712-13 & n.10; Marzen I, supra note 20, at 63-67. 
 23. R. H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights in 
the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401, 403-04 (2007); Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law 
Originalism for the Twenty-First Century—A Principle of Judicial Restraint, Not Invention, 40 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 383, 385, 391 (2007). 
 24. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 404-07; Miller, supra note 10, at 217; see e.g., Romans 
1:19-29; Romans 2:14-15. For a lucid discussion of divine law as natural law, see DAVID 
VANDRUNEN, A BIBLICAL CASE FOR NATURAL LAW (Acton Inst. 2008) (referencing THOMAS 
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1a 2ae Q. 91, art.2; JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
EPISTLE OF PAUL THE APOSTLE TO THE ROMANS (John Owen trans., William B. Eerdman Publ’g 
Co. 1947); DOUGLAS J. MOO, THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS 148-51 (William B. Eerdman 
Publ’g Co. 1996); A. ANDREW DAS, PAUL, THE LAW, AND THE COVENANT 180-82 (Hendrickson 
Publishers 2001)). 
 25. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 416-18; Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of 
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2006) (“[T]he Founders expected judges to draw 
upon natural law principles as sources of decision in both common law cases and in the 
course of interpreting legislative enactments.”); Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of 
Law and Legal Education: An Historical Framework—A History of U.S. Legal Education 
Phase I: From the Founding of the Republic Until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1041, 
1106-08 (2006); Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1038-40 (1994). 
 26. Helmholz, supra note 23, at 407. David Hume prominently opposed the notion that 
suicide should be prohibited as a violation of natural law, arguing that we regularly “violate” 
natural law and that is not necessarily negative. See Marzen I, supra note 20, at 35-36. 
Hume’s argument was cast, however, mostly in terms of the physical laws of nature and was 
based on his assertion that human life had no special sanctity or importance. See id. at 36 
(“The life of a man is of no greater importance than that of an oyster.”). Hume cannot, 
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Additionally, Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England was 
once the “bible” for lawyers and judges,27 characterized suicide as “self-
murder” and “among the highest crimes.”28 Thus, the divine law, natural 
law, English common law, and Britain’s statutory law traditions all 
historically embody an inviolable, objective standard that killing a human 
being by suicide is wrong. 
B.  Contemporary British Statutory Law: The 1961 Suicide Act  
Reflecting the inviolable, objective standard, the United Kingdom 
enacted statutory law prohibiting assisted suicide.29 As originally 
promulgated, the United Kingdom’s Suicide Act 1961 (“Suicide Act”), 
provided that “[a] person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide 
of another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide, shall be liable on 
conviction on indictment to imprisonment . . . .”30 
On its face, the Suicide Act broadly covered all aspects of assisted suicide. 
To be sure, like many other governments, the United Kingdom, in the 
Suicide Act, dropped criminal sanctions for the person attempting suicide.31 
                                                                                                                                      
therefore, be said to represent the views of the majority of Western people or legal history, 
although more than a few prominent legal scholars have also fallen into that black hole and 
called it light. See, e.g., Crone, supra note 6, at 412-15. 
 27. Marzen I, supra note 20, at 62, 71, 72; Kirk, supra note 25, at 1038 (noting that 
Edmund Burke reported that by 1775, nearly as many copies of the Commentary had been 
sold in America as in England); Jones, supra note 25, at 1055-57; Kmiec, supra note 23, at 
391-92; Miller, supra note 10, at 219. 
 28. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ch. 14, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch14.asp. Indeed, courts sometimes 
referred to “self-preservation” as “the first law of nature.” Helmholz, supra note 23, at 409 
(quoting various cases). 
 29. Suicide Act, supra note 1; R (Pretty) v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [2001] UKHL 61, 
[2002] 1 A.C. 800 [35] (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter Pretty v. DPP]; see also 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710 (noting that in almost every Western democracy it is a crime to 
assist a suicide). 
 30. Suicide Act, supra note 1, § 2(1). By enacting the Suicide Act 1961, Parliament 
displaced the common law offense. See, e.g., Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [25], [2010] 1 A.C. 345, 
385. The Coroners and Justice Act amended the language of the Suicide Act so that a person 
commits an offense if he or she does an act capable or encouraging or assisting the suicide or 
attempted suicide of another person. See Coroners and Justice Bill, 2009, H.L. Bill [96], §§ 
46-48. (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2001/61.html [hereinafter 
Coroners Bill].  
 31. Suicide Act, supra note 1, § 1. In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, 
many governments abolished the penalties for suicide by statutory or constitutional 
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It is important to note, however, that neither the United Kingdom nor these 
other governments did so because they believed suicide was acceptable.32 
Thus, after the United Kingdom statutorily decriminalized suicide, judicial 
opinions in the House of Lords described the change as a way to promote 
life.33 
The provisions of the Suicide Act acknowledged that legitimizing assisted 
suicide inherently threatens the most vulnerable among us. Similarly, in 
judicial opinions, the House of Lords historically recognized such risks.34 
Undeniably, many people in the final stages of life cannot communicate 
effectively. Whilst they may have once indicated a preference to avoid end-
of-life suffering, no-one knows whether, at the time they cannot 
communicate, they still desire to extinguish their lives unnaturally.  
Additionally, Britain’s statutory proscriptions against assisted suicide 
reflect the notion that government-authorized suicide creates a frightening 
duty to die. Judicial opinions in the House of Lords also historically 
recognized that the elderly might choose suicide, “not from a desire to die 
                                                                                                                                      
provisions. Marzen I, supra note 20, at 67-68. How governments treated those who assisted 
in suicides is unclear due to a lack of reporting and codification of case law and legislation. 
Id. at 70-76 (concluding that in the nineteenth century many governments prohibited 
assisted suicide). From a drafting perspective, the wording of the Suicide Act 1961 creates an 
interesting point of criminal law. This is because “the offence of aiding and abetting the 
suicide of another under section 2(1) Suicide Act 1961 is unique in that the critical act—
suicide—is not itself unlawful, unlike any other aiding and abetting offence.” Purdy, [2009] 
UKHL 45 [49], 1 A.C. at 393 (quoting Keir Starmer, Decision on Prosecution – The Death By 
Suicide of Daniel James, THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (Dec. 9, 2008), 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/ death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james/). 
 32. Rather, governments came to view the penalties as inappropriate either because they 
imposed unjustifiable hardship on the victims’ families or because the act was deemed a 
manifestation of mental illness, and thus not punishable. Marzen I, supra note 20, at 67-100; 
Marzen II, supra note 21, at 264-65; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 774. 
 33. See Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [106], 1 A.C. at 847-48 (“There were good 
reasons for wishing to decriminalise the act [suicide] itself. The removal of the fear of 
prosecution and of the stigma was likely to make it easier to deter those who were planning 
or attempting suicide. Broadly speaking, it was a measure in favour of saving life . . . .”). 
Ironically, in Purdy, Lord Brown turns this underlying policy designed to protect life on its 
head by using it to legitimize assisting suicide. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [82], 1 A.C. at 403-04 
(“[T]he assistance criminalised by section 2(1) is assistance which those lawfully intent on 
suicide may require so as to enable them to fulfil their chosen end.”).  
 34. See Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [28], 1 A.C. at 822 (“The Government can see no 
basis for permitting assisted suicide. Such a change would be open to abuse and put the lives 
of the weak and vulnerable at risk.”) (quoting the Government Response accepting the 
recommendation of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics). 
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or a willingness to stop living, but from a desire to stop being a burden to 
others.”35 
C.  Pro-Suicide Statutory Proposals: Advocates Unsuccessfully Attempt to 
Legalize Assisted Suicide Killings in the United Kingdom 
Consistent with Britain’s cultural heritage and legal traditions, 
Parliament repeatedly defeated endeavours to undercut the protections 
provided in the Suicide Act. To be sure, several members of Parliament 
relentlessly sought to shift the political paradigm.36 Lord Joffe, whose self-
proclaimed life mission is to promote dying, led the attack.37 In 2002 and 
2003, Lord Joffe tried unsuccessfully to legalize assisted suicide by 
proposing the Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill—later known as the Assisted 
Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill.38 Parliament again rejected the pro-suicide 
proposal in both 2005 and 2006.39 
The situation involving British pro-suicide advocate Debbie Purdy 
prompted another attempt to pass pro-suicide legislation.40 Diagnosed with 
a terminal disease, Purdy wanted to kill herself after the illness progressed 
to a certain stage.41 She stated that she could not accomplish the act without 
assistance.42 When the time came, she wanted her husband to assist in her 
suicide killing by helping her travel to another country where suicide was 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. See Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [29], 1 A.C. at 823 (“We are also concerned that 
vulnerable people—the elderly, lonely, sick or distressed—would feel pressure, whether real 
or imagined, to request early death.”) (quoting a report by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics). 
 36. See Helene Mulholland, A Matter of Life and Death, THE GUARDIAN (October 24, 
2005, 7:20 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2005/oct/24/health.politics1. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL], THE PUBLIC WHIP (May 12, 2006, 
5:17 PM), http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division.php?date=2006-05-12&number=1&house= 
lords. 
 40. See Aufua Hirsch, Debbie Purdy wins ‘significant legal victory’ on assisted suicide, 
The Guardian (July 30, 2009, 1:20 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/ 
jul/30/debbie-purdy-assisted-suicide-legal-victory; Coroners Amendment, supra note 2. 
 41. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [17], [2010] 1 A.C. 345, 381-82. 
 42. Id. 
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legal.43 While Purdy’s situation gained the limelight, Parliament debated the 
Coroners and Justice Bill.44 
Consistent with the cultural heritage and legal traditions of the United 
Kingdom, members of Parliament originally introduced the Coroners and 
Justice Bill to strengthen British anti-assisted suicide law. The provisions 
included in the Coroners and Justice Act of 2009 clarified that Britain’s 
proscription against assisting suicide: 1) extended to those who do not 
know the person who wants to die,45 and 2) applied to assisters of attempted 
suicides regardless of whether an attempted suicide or suicide occurs.46 
Pro-suicide proponents in Parliament, however, attempted to use the 
Coroners and Justice Bill as a vehicle to legalize assisted suicide.47 Using 
Debbie Purdy’s situation as justification, pro-suicide proponents proposed 
various amendments. One amendment, intended to authorize assisted 
killing of British citizens in Purdy’s situation, counter-intuitively indicated 
that  
an individual . . . is not to be treated as capable of encouraging or 
assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another adult . . . if . . 
. the act is done solely or principally for the purpose of enabling 
or assisting [another adult] to travel to a country or territory in 
which assisted dying is lawful . . . .48  
This proposed amendment would have codified the government-sanctioned 
killing of human life under prescribed conditions.49 
Thus, an individual in the United Kingdom could put another human 
being on a train, sending that person to another country to be killed. The 
proposed amendment cloaked the individual assisting in the killing with 
                                                                                                                                      
 43. Id. 
 44. Michael Hirst, Assisted Suicide after Purdy: The Unresolved Issue, [2009] CRIM. L.R. 
870 (Eng.); Coroners Bill, supra note 30. 
 45. Coroners Bill, supra note 30, § 46(1A). 
 46. Id. § 46(1B). 
 47. See, e.g., Coroners Amendment, supra note 2. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Coroners Amendment, supra note 2. The act reads, in relevant part: 
(1) An act by an individual (“D”) is not to be treated as capable of encouraging 
or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another adult (“T”) if—(a) the 
act is done solely or principally for the purpose of enabling or assisting T to 
travel to a country or territory in which assisted dying is lawful . . . . 
Id. 
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complete immunity. Again, counter-intuitively, the proposed law continued 
to protect human life as long as the train did not leave the United Kingdom.  
Another amendment proposed putting doctors, serving as coroners, in 
the position of authorizing the killing of a human being.50 Upon 
“certification from a coroner,” the amendment would have allowed an 
individual to assist another in committing suicide if the person wishing to 
die was “suffering from a confirmed, incurable and disabling illness which 
prevents him from carrying through his own wish to bring his life to a 
close.”51 
The pro-suicide proposal aggressively challenged long-established ethical 
elements of medical practice in the United Kingdom. The British Medical 
Association and other respected health care organizations nonetheless 
continued to affirm the moral proscription against assisted suicide as the 
very foundation of medical ethics.52 The Hippocratic Oath, written during 
the fifth to fourth centuries B.C., declares, “I will neither give a deadly drug 
to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.”53 Such 
a standard is consistent with God’s revealed, inviolable standard reflected in 
the common law and other historical and legal traditions of the United 
Kingdom.54 Indeed, assisted suicide is entirely irreconcilable with a doctor’s 
calling to heal.55 Astonishingly, the pro-suicide proposals before Parliament 
failed to provide any ethical standards of implementation or enforcement 
mechanisms for compliance by physicians. Not surprisingly, therefore, no 
data-collection requirements that might provide some accountability even 
existed. Furthermore, despite vague, subjective requirements concerning 
the physical and mental state of the patient, no definitional safeguards 
                                                                                                                                      
50  Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. End of Life Decisions: Views of the BMA, BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 4 (2009), 
available at http://www.bma.org.uk/images/endlifedecisionsaug2009_tcm41-190116.pdf; see, 
e.g., Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656263; accord A.M.A CODE OF MEDICAL 
ETHICS, § 2.211 (1996), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/ 
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page? (prohibiting physician assistance in 
assisted suicide or euthanasia). 
 53. LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND 
INTERPRETATION 6 (Henry E. Sigerist ed, The Johns Hopkins Press 1943). 
 54. The creation of the Hippocratic Oath in ancient Greek culture has been 
foundational in Western medical ethics, and it remains centrally relevant in contemporary 
medical practice. See, e.g., C. Everett Koop, Introduction, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 55. Id. at 2. 
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existed to protect vulnerable or elderly patients. Moreover, no duty to 
discuss other treatment options or palliative care alternatives for pain 
management existed anywhere in the proposed statutory scheme.  
Thus, with virtually no protection for the most vulnerable of British 
citizens, the proposed pro-suicide amendments to the Coroners and Justice 
Bill expressly authorized individuals, in prescribed circumstances, to assist 
in the suicide killing of a human being.56 Consistent with and informed by 
the deeply-rooted first principles reflected in Britain’s legal history and 
tradition, a majority of those voting on the pro-suicide provisions voted 
against them.57 
D.  The Purdy Decision: Surrendering Sovereignty and Conscience? 
Not long after Parliament rejected pro-suicide amendments to the 
Coroners and Justice Bill, a court case initiated by Debbie Purdy came 
before five Law Lords. Although the Suicide Act broadly covered all aspects 
of assisted suicide, Purdy raised the issue as to whether an individual could 
assist someone to travel to another country where assisted suicide is legal 
and expect to escape prosecution.58 Among other things, Purdy contended 
that the assisted suicide prohibition in the Suicide Act constituted an 
interference with her privacy rights under Article 8(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“European Convention”).59 Thus, Purdy 
asserted that she possessed a human right, grounded in privacy, to decide to 
                                                                                                                                      
 56. Coroners Amendment, supra note 2. The language of the proposed amendment is as 
follows: 
Notwithstanding sections 49 to 51, no offence shall have been committed if 
assistance is given to a person to commit suicide who is suffering from a 
confirmed, incurable and disabling illness which prevents him from carrying 
through his own wish to bring his life to a close, if the person has received 
certification from a coroner who has investigated the circumstances, and 
satisfied himself that it is indeed the free and settled wish of the person that he 
brings his life to a close. 
Id. 
 57. See Coroners and Justice Bill—Committee (5th Day)—Assisted Suicide, THE PUBLIC 
WHIP (July 7, 2009, 8:03 PM), http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division.php?date=2009-07-
07&number=1&house=lords; see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [58], [2010] 1 A.C. 345, 396. 
 58. See, e.g., Purdy, [2009] UKHL at [18-25, 90-93], 1 A.C. at 382-85, 405-06. 
 59. Id. at [28], 1 A.C. at 386. The European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter 
“European Convention”) in paragraph 1 of Article 8 provides: “Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” See also id. at [29], 
1 A.C. at 386. 
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kill herself, and that the statutory proscription against assisting suicide 
infringed this right.60 
To understand fully the context of Purdy, one must review what 
happened beforehand. Prior to Purdy came Pretty v. DPP,61 which involved 
a woman who also desired to kill herself with the assistance of her 
husband.62 When Pretty reached the House of Lords, the court confirmed 
that no right to commit suicide existed in the United Kingdom: 
while the 1961 Act abrogated the rule of law whereby it was a 
crime for a person to commit . . . suicide, it conferred no right on 
anyone to do so. . . . The policy of the law remained firmly 
adverse to suicide . . . .63 
Moreover, on the issue raised by Mrs. Pretty, the Law Lords held that 
Article 8 pertained to protecting personal autonomy while the individual 
was alive, but did not confer a right to decide to commit suicide.64 
The Pretty case was then heard by the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”), now styled as Pretty v. United Kingdom.65 Turning a blind eye to 
the cultural and legal traditions of Great Britain, the ECHR reached a very 
different conclusion from the British court. The ECHR concluded that 
exercising a choice to kill human life via suicide constituted a human right 
                                                                                                                                      
 60. Id. at [28-31], 1 A.C. at 386-87. She also contended that because the Government 
failed to provide an offense-specific prosecution policy for assisted suicide, such interference 
violated Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention, which requires interference 
with a right to be “in accordance with the law.” Id.; see also Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 2. 
In this regard, Purdy contended that without such guidance she lacked enough information 
to make a decision—so as to be able to challenge a government authority if it arbitrarily 
interferes with rights safeguarded by the Convention. Purdy, [2009] UKHL at [28-31], 1 A.C. 
at 386-87. The European Convention in paragraph 2 of Article 8 provides: “There shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the existence of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law . . . .” Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 2. 
 61. Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61, [2002] 1 A.C. 800. 
 62. Id. at [29], 1 A.C. at 809; see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [71], 1 A.C. at 400. 
 63. Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [35], 1 A.C. at 825; see also Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997) (commenting on the common-law tradition of 
disapproval toward suicide and assisting suicide). 
 64. Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL 61 [61], 1 A.C. at 835; see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 
[32], 1 A.C. at 387. 
 65. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2002) [hereinafter “Pretty v. UK”]. 
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under Article 8(1).66 The ECHR also held that the Suicide Act interfered 
with this right.67 
With the dichotomy of the Pretty decisions serving as the prologue, 
Purdy began its journey through the British courts. The Court of Appeal 
faced the issue of whether, under Article 8(1) of the European Convention, 
Purdy possessed a human right to decide to kill herself.68 Before deciding 
the issues, the Court of Appeal had to first determine whether to follow the 
British court precedent or the ECHR precedent. The Court of Appeal 
applied the former, confirming that Article 8(1) of the European 
Convention conferred no right to commit suicide.69 Purdy appealed the 
decision to the House of Lords.  
The five Law Lords began by relying upon the ECHR’s analysis in Pretty 
to resolve the issues raised by Purdy, rather than standing by their previous 
precedent in Pretty v. DPP.70 In so doing, the Law Lords discarded the 
deeply-rooted British cultural and legal traditions protecting human life 
against suicide killings. In its place, the Law Lords adopted the ECHR’s 
construction of Article 8(1) of the European Convention71 holding that the 
decision to kill human life via suicide was a human right. Thus, each Law 
Lord concluded that Purdy possessed a human right under the European 
Convention to decide to kill herself. After the Law Lords held that Purdy 
had that human right, it further concluded that the assisted suicide 
prohibition in the Suicide Act constituted an interference with that right. 
Because the Government failed to provide an offense-specific prosecution 
policy for assisted suicide, the Law Lords further found that such 
interference violated Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European Convention 
                                                                                                                                      
 66. Id. at 37. 
 67. Id. at 37-40. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) disagreed with the 
British Court, asserting: “The Court is not prepared to exclude that this constitutes an 
interference with her right to respect for private life as guaranteed under Article 8(1) of the 
Convention.” Id. at 37. Given that a right existed, the Court then proceeded to evaluate 
whether this interference conformed to the requirements of Article 8, paragraph 2 of the 
European Convention. Id. at 37-40. The Court concluded the interference in this instance 
was justified. Id. at 39. 
 68. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [32], 1 A.C. at 387. The Court of Appeal decision is 
reported at [2009] EWCA (Civ) 92 (Eng.). 
 69. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [32], 1 A.C. at 387.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at [29], 1 A.C. at 386. Article 8, paragraph 1 of the European Convention 
provides: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.” Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 1. 
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because the Government’s interference with the right was not “in 
accordance with the law.”72 
How could the five Law Lords in Purdy so inconsistently interpret 
existing pro-life law given the deeply-rooted first principles reflected in its 
nation’s legal history and tradition? The answer lies in understanding the 
lens through which they view the world.73 The Law Lords and other assisted 
suicide proponents reject the moral absolute of an inviolable standard. In its 
place, they employ a human-centred, subjective, morally-relative worldview 
of legal positivism. When the five Law Lords deemed the killing of human 
life via suicide a human right, they did more than defer to the ECHR. They 
shifted a nation’s jurisprudential worldview. Before Purdy, British 
jurisprudence saw a moral absolute in the innate, positive value of 
vulnerable human life. Judges and lawmakers therefore viewed such life as 
worthy of governmental protection and proscribed conduct associated with 
assisted suicide killing. The five Law Lords in Purdy, instead, chose to view 
the matter through the subjective lens of morally-relative legal positivism, 
which enabled them to create law without looking to any moral standard of 
right or wrong. Viewed through the subjective lens of moral relativism, 
deciding to kill human life via suicide devolves into a matter of personal 
autonomy or convenience. Thus, the value of a particular human life in the 
United Kingdom now varies with the circumstances.  
To completely comprehend the significance of this jurisprudential shift, 
it is helpful to analyze the mechanics of the court’s analytical process. 
Under traditional notions of the rule of law, government can prohibit 
conduct.74 Thus, consistent with an inviolable standard that human life has 
                                                                                                                                      
 72. Purdy, [2009] UKHL 45 [30-31, 40-56], 1 A.C. at 386-87, 390-96. The Court held 
that without such guidance, individuals like Mrs. Purdy lacked enough information with 
which to make a decision—so as to be able to challenge a Government authority if it 
arbitrarily interfered with rights safeguarded by the European Convention. Id. The European 
Convention, Article 8, paragraph 2 provides: “There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the existence of this right except such as is in accordance with the law . . . .” 
Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 8, para. 2); see also Purdy, [2009] UKHL at [29], 1 A.C. at 386. 
 73. See Wagner, supra note 6.  
 74. Herbert W. Titus, The Bible & American Law, 2 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 305, 311 (2008). 
Titus’ descriptive analysis of this principle is a good example of the unalienable worldview:  
Let us now look at the thirteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. We 
can all certainly agree that verse four addresses the role of the civil ruler as a 
minister of God. In the Greek, he is a deacon of God, he is a servant of God. 
Notice carefully that verse four authorizes the civil ruler to wield the sword 
against wrong doing. Now, that is a very important first principle: The civil ruler 
has authority over conduct. Blackstone reflects this view in his definition of 
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value at all stages, the United Kingdom enacted laws prohibiting a person 
from assisting in the commission of a suicide killing. Using the evolving 
human-centered, morally-relative approach of legal positivism, the Law 
Lords took this prohibited conduct and judicially re-characterized it as an 
essential liberty interest cloaked with the status of a “human right”—i.e.,  a 
privacy right of personal autonomy to make end-of-life choices. It was no 
accident that the newly-created human right completely contradicted the 
inalienable, inviolable standard.75 
E.  Purdy’s Progeny—Public Prosecution Guidelines 
In response to the Law Lords’s discussion in Purdy criticizing the lack of 
an offense-specific prosecution policy, Britain’s Director of Public 
Prosecution (“Director”) drafted policy guidelines in conformance with the 
Law Lords’ decision declaring assisted suicide a human right.76 
Unfortunately, the new guidelines create more than a little uncertainty in 
the law. The guidelines begin by ostensibly suggesting that Purdy did 
nothing to change assisted suicide law in the United Kingdom:  
The case of Purdy did not change the law: only Parliament can 
change the law on encouraging or assisting suicide. 
This policy does not in any way “decriminalize” the offence 
of encouraging or assisting suicide. Nothing in this policy can be 
taken to amount to an assurance that a person will be immune 
from prosecution if he or she does an act that encourages or 
assists the suicide or the attempted suicide of another person.77 
Nevertheless, the guidelines provide that whether someone who assisted 
in suicide will be prosecuted is left to the discretion of the prosecutor:  
[t]his was recognised by the House of Lords in the Purdy case 
where Lord Hope stated that: “[i]t has long been recognised that 
a prosecution does not follow automatically whenever an offence 
                                                                                                                                      
‘municipal law,’ i.e., the law of civil society, describing it as ‘a rule of civil 
conduct.’ 
Id.  
 75. For a deeper discussion of the jurisprudential mechanics involved, see Wagner, 
supra note 6. 
 76. Director of Public Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of 
Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html. 
 77. Id. at paras. 5-6. 
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is believed to have been committed”. . . . He went on to endorse 
the approach adopted by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney 
General in 1951, when he stated in the House of Commons that: 
“[i]t has never been the rule . . . that criminal offences must 
automatically be the subject of prosecution.” 
Accordingly, where there is sufficient evidence to justify a 
prosecution, prosecutors must go on to consider whether a 
prosecution is required in the public interest.78 
Thus, the once inviolable standard, deeply rooted in the nation’s legal 
traditions and reflected in its statutory law, is no more. Instead, the value of 
any particular British human life rests in the hands of individual 
government prosecutors. In deciding not to protect human life against an 
assisted suicide killing, prosecutors now may arbitrarily rely upon 
ambiguous provisions in the guidelines to refuse to prosecute. Under the 
guideline’s factors: 
[a] prosecution is less likely to be required if: 
1. the victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and 
informed decision to commit suicide; 
2. the suspect was wholly motivated by compassion; 
3. the actions of the suspect, although sufficient to come within 
the definition of the offence, were of only minor 
encouragement or assistance; 
4. the suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from taking 
the course of action which resulted in his or her suicide; 
5. the actions of the suspect may be characterised as reluctant 
encouragement or assistance in the face of a determined 
wish on the part of the victim to commit suicide; 
6. the suspect reported the victim’s suicide to the police and 
fully assisted them in their enquiries into the circumstances 
of the suicide or the attempt and his or her part in providing 
encouragement or assistance.79 
These factors create colossal excuses allowing for assisted suicide without 
fear of prosecution. Attempts to disprove these factors become problematic 
because, in the words of Dr. Peter Saunders, “[a]nyone who takes part in an 
                                                                                                                                      
 78. Id. at paras. 36-37. 
 79. Id. at para. 45. 
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assisted suicide is going to claim they were acting out of compassion. The 
only witness who really knows will be dead.”80 
The Director’s assisted suicide guidelines became effective in February of 
2010. Thereafter, prosecutors did not file charges in twenty assisted suicides 
committed during 2010.81 According to the Director, many of the cases 
involved family members assisting in the suicide.82 The disturbing irony is 
that this increase in assisted suicides took place while assisted suicide was 
still illegal in Britain.83  
As the public debate on assisted suicide continues, it makes sense to 
review the national implications that accompany such a jurisprudential 
shift.84 In the next section, therefore, we address the implications of turning 
down the road of morally-relative legal positivism.  
PART II. 
TURNING DOWN A DANGEROUS ROAD WITH DARK CONSEQUENCES  
Suicide-killing proponents insist that the United Kingdom turn off the 
path of self-evident inalienable truth—embodied in its deeply-rooted 
natural, common, and positive law traditions—onto a path of legal 
positivism. Humankind has travelled down this immorally-relative road 
before with tragic consequences. Before the United Kingdom proceeds past 
a point of no return regarding its suicide-killing policy, we might consider 
whether the consequences are worth the supposed convenience.  
Policy positions permitting assistance in suicide killings proceed from a 
mistaken premise that, in certain conditions, human life no longer has 
positive value or purpose. That presupposition has incalculably grave 
implications for every citizen in the United Kingdom. When government 
policy relegates the value of life to an immorally-relative individual choice, 
no benchmark exists against which to measure right from wrong or good 
                                                                                                                                      
 80. DPP Fails to Charge over 20 Suspected Assisted Suicides, CHRISTIAN CONCERN (Dec. 
21, 2010), http://www.christianconcern.com/our-concerns/end-of-life/dpp-fails-to-charge-
over-20-suspected-assisted-suicides. 
 81. Steve Doughty, No Charges in 20 Assisted-Suicide Cases as Public Prosecution is 
Accused of Re-Writing Law, MAIL ONLINE (Dec. 15, 2010, 8:41 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1338700/No-charges-20-assisted-suicide-cases-
public-prosecutor-accused-rewriting-law.html. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Crone, supra note 6, at 422; see also McConnell, supra note 6, at 667-69. 
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from evil. If no moral reference point exists for those governing in the 
United Kingdom, then nothing prevents taking human life in other ways, or 
for other people in different situations. History reveals terrible costs 
associated with such an approach. Once liberated from objective, moral 
standards by subjective relativism, the individual is completely subject to 
the will of any stronger individual or group; for no moral standard exists to 
prevent the imposition of that stronger subject’s “morality.”85 Thus, instead 
of leading from the alleged “oppression of tradition” to the freedom it 
promises, the morally-relative legal positivist path leads to totalitarian 
tyranny.86 
Many scholars document that although present proposals protecting 
suicide proceed down this dangerous road, these proposals were not the 
first steps taken down the perilous path.87 During the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries, eugenics movements advocated for the 
elimination of “less valuable” human beings.88 Germany subsequently 
legalized voluntary euthanasia.89 Thereafter, the Nazis killed hundreds of 
thousands of the mentally ill—all prior to the unspeakable tragedy of the 
Holocaust.90 The push to make assisted suicide, or “mercy killing,” a normal 
and “compassionate” procedure was happening as early as the 1920s in 
Germany.91 This approach transformed the role of a physician from that of 
purely a healer to both healer and killer.92 The end result was Auschwitz and 
places like it. Dr. Jay Lifton conducted extensive research and interviews of 
the Nazi doctors who committed these mass killings.93 Lifton established 
that the first step enabling the Nazis’ mass killings was the removal of the 
barrier between healing and killing:94 “Medicalization of killing—the 
                                                                                                                                      
 85. HADLEY ARKES, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE 31 (2002). 
 86. See Charles E. Rice, Rights and the Need for Objective Moral Limits, 3 AVE MARIA L. 
REV. 259, 270-71, 274 (2005). That it may be a tyranny of the majority is no comfort, for 
today’s majority may become tomorrow’s minority. See ARKES, supra note 85, at 31. 
 87. KATHLEEN M. FOLEY & HERBERT HENDIN, THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR 
THE RIGHT TO END-OF-LIFE CARE 6-7 (1st ed. 2002). 
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imagery of killing in the name of healing—was crucial to that terrible step. 
At the heart of the Nazi enterprise, then, is the destruction of the boundary 
between healing and killing.”95 
The question must be asked, how could doctors reconcile the killing of 
people with their vow to uphold the Hippocratic Oath? When Dr. Fritz 
Klein was asked this question, he answered, “Of course I am a doctor and I 
want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a 
gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is a gangrenous 
appendix in the body of mankind.”96 Because of his morally-relative 
worldview, Dr. Klein reached the deluded conclusion that he was upholding 
the Hippocratic Oath and serving mankind by slaughtering thousands of 
Jews. 
The perverted idea that killing a patient is compassionate and therapeutic 
first gained traction from the work of two German professors, Karl Binding 
and Alfred Hoche.97 In 1920, they published their work entitled “The 
Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Life.”98 This work postulated that 
some people are unworthy of life. Those unworthy of life included not only 
the incurably ill, but also many mentally ill and deformed children.99 They 
stressed the therapeutic goal of destroying an unworthy life and described it 
as “purely a healing treatment” and a “healing work.”100 Hoche insisted the 
policy was compassionate and consistent with medical ethics.101 He wrote 
that putting people to death “is not to be equated with other types of killing 
. . . but [is] an allowable, useful act.”102 
Hoche further justified the killing policy by deeming the mentally and 
physically ill a tremendous burden for society to bear.103 He concluded: 
“single less valuable members have to be abandoned and pushed out.”104 Dr. 
Lifton exposed Hoche’s “striking note of medical hubris in insisting that 
‘the physician has no doubt about the hundred-percent certainty of correct 
selection’ and ‘proven scientific criteria’ to establish the ‘impossibility of 
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improvement of a mentally dead person.’”105 In other words, these doctors 
thought so highly of their knowledge and skill that they could be certain a 
“mentally dead” person will never recover. According to their morally-
relative standard, therefore, no problem existed with destroying that life. 
The supposed compassionate killing of mentally or physically “unworthy 
lives” eventually evolved into a justification for the slaughter of thousands 
of Jews, likewise deemed “unworthy.”106 And so we learn from history 
where the path of killing as an accepted medical treatment leads. Hoche’s 
and Binding’s justifications validating “compassionate” killing of a patient 
are eerily similar to contemporary justifications for assisted suicide.  
In the 1940s, euthanasia proponents like Dr. Foster Kennedy advocated, 
on eugenics grounds, compulsory euthanasia for retarded children.107 By the 
1970s, euthanasia proponents evolved their position to easing the “burden” 
of caring for the elderly, and then to easing suffering,108 and now to “liberty 
of choice.”  
A more recent example of the consequences of legalizing assisted suicide 
is found in the Netherlands. There, “safeguards” in the pro-suicide Dutch 
law failed to protect Dutch citizens. Evidence revealed that thousands were 
killed, including many unreported assisted suicides, that many failed to 
follow established guidelines for voluntariness or consultation, and that 
many lives were extinguished without consent.109 Where did travelling 
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down the path of euthanasia take the Netherlands? A Dutch healthcare 
facility concedes it euthanized newborn infants, and a physician who killed 
the disabled babies unapologetically asserts his conduct is proper.110 Thus, 
society continues to slouch toward Gomorrah—and at an increasingly faster 
pace as it replaces God’s inviolable, moral standard with a morally-relative, 
individual convenience.111 
What can policymakers in the United Kingdom learn from the 
experience of its Western neighbours? One thing is that which United 
Kingdom pro-suicide proponents present as a limited right to assisted 
suicide will “likely, in effect, [lead to] a much broader licence.”112 The most 
recent proponent and activist for legalizing assisted suicide in the United 
Kingdom is Lord Falconer.113 Leading a supposedly unbiased Commission 
on Death and Dying, Falconer’s commission is studying if and how assisted 
suicide policy should be implemented in the United Kingdom.114 The 
commission is made up of twelve members, most of whom favor legalized 
assisted suicide.115 Nine of the twelve members already work in the field and 
support assisted suicide.116 The remaining three on the commission are not 
known to oppose assisted suicide.117 The chair of the commission, Lord 
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Falconer, is a long-time proponent of assisted suicide, campaigning to 
legalize assisted suicide in the United Kingdom.118 Far from balanced, Lord 
Falconer is using this commission as a vehicle to drive the pro-assisted 
suicide policy in the United Kingdom.119 How far down the terrible path we 
have trod. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the beginning of its existence, the United Kingdom’s divine and 
natural law traditions embodied God’s sacred standard. That standard 
requires us not to assist in the killing of human life He created. Discerning 
the truth of this ancient, inviolable benchmark, the common and statutory 
law of Britain reflected its moral reference point and prohibited assisted 
suicide. In the name of progress, Purdy and its pro-suicide progeny reject 
the inviolable standard underlying current statutory proscriptions against 
assisted killing. Instead, Purdy and its progeny take the United Kingdom 
down the morally-relative road of legal positivism. The grave implications 
for a nation that accompany such a choice are historically clear and 
profoundly frightening. C.S. Lewis noted, 
“We all want progress. But progress means getting nearer to the 
place where you want to be. And if you have taken a wrong 
turning, then to go forward does not get you any nearer. If we are 
on the wrong road, progress means doing an about-turn and 
walking back to the right road; and in that case the man who 
turns back soonest is the most progressive man.”120 
Only by turning around and walking back to the right road will the 
United Kingdom ever again find the inherent value of human life worthy of 
government protection.  
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